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Editorial
Dutch higher court places further limitations on physician-
assisted death
Recently a Dutch higher court judged that physicians
should not be allowed to end the lives of patients for
non-medical reasons. In the case before the court a
general practitioner had ended the life of an elderly
patient—a former member of the Dutch Senate—at
the latter’s urgent and repeated requests. Although he
had not been seriously ill and a consultant psychiatrist
had not found any indications of psychiatric illness, the
patient did not wish to go on living any longer.
At the heart of the general practitioner’s main argu-
ment in defence of the way he had dealt with his
patient’s request was his conviction that his patient
had suffered unbearably under the need to continue
living life without hope and in continuous mental
despair.
Since 1984 different courts in the Netherlands—includ-
ing the higher court in question have formulated stan-
dards for justifiable physician-assisted death, includ-
ing the presence of an explicit, well-considered and
repeated request except in the case of very young chil-
dren; suffering without hope or a realistic alternative
that might reduce suffering; consultation with another
physician; and a medically justifiable way of terminat-
ing life. The definition of suffering is not restricted to
the terminal stages of life or to suffering through phys-
ical causes. Chronic, severe and untreatable psych-
iatric illnesses also constitute justifiable reasons for
physician-assisted death. Physicians who are involved
in such deaths are not allowed to sign the relevant
death certificate. Recently a law was passed by the
Dutch parliament legalising the standards mentioned.
The law regulates euthanasia, physician-assisted sui-
cide and other cases of justifiable assisted death.
Euthanasia is defined as the actual and intended ter-
mination of someone’s life by another person at the
former’s explicit request. Assisted suicide is defined as
helping somebody to terminate his or her life at his or
her explicit request. Physician-assisted death covers
all actions by a doctor which result in intended early
death, and, therefore, includes not only euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide but also actions such
as ending the life of children with multiple serious
defects and patients in a persistent vegetative state.
In 1991, the Dutch government started an information
campaign to improve the quality of physician-assisted
death and to provide instruments for public and social
control. The government hoped to reach full coverage
of all cases and to make all procedures transparent
w1x. The new law enables the setting up of committees,
each composed of a lawyer, an ethicist and a physi-
cian, which will consider cases submitted to them.
The higher court has judged that the assessment of
suffering that may justify physician-assisted death
shall be limited to the domain that is compatible with
a physician’s training and qualifications in the area of
medicine. This does not imply that the court limits the
domain of the physician’s intervention to terminal ill-
ness or to suffering due to physical causes. Physicians
who terminate the lives of patients in the final stages
of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) or with chronic,
untreatable depression, and who meet the standards
set by former court hearings will not be prosecuted.
However, the court has stated that physicians lack the
appropriate qualifications to judge the full domain of
human life. Situations in which a patient has reached
old age, has some age-related handicaps and is con-
vinced that further life is useless, do constitute a legal
argument in favour of meeting a patient’s wish. The
court acknowledges that it is not always possible to
distinguish suffering from its causes, and observes
that, as a result of its judgement, some human beings
will not be able to receive assistance from their phy-
sician if they wish their lives to be terminated. How-
ever, in the type of cases mentioned the court regards
the active involvement of a physician as unacceptable.
Some see the judgement as an intolerable restriction
on the autonomy of human beings. Apart from the
argument that suffering cannot be divided into a med-
ical and a non-medical domain they would argue that
in our society physicians are the only persons to have
access to lethal drugs as well as the knowledge to
apply such drugs appropriately. General practitioners,
the group of professionals who are most often involved
in physician assisted death, have expressed the objec-
tion that more and more patients will come to assume
that physicians are obliged to respond to the patient’s
request for termination, even in cases in which suffer-
ing is judged by the GP to be minor and realistic alter-
natives are available, or patients do not actually suffer
but anticipate possible future suffering.
In the case heard by the higher court I was one of
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arguments I put forward. Although I belonged to the
small group of physicians who had, already in the
1970s, defended publicly the thesis that physicians
must be given the opportunity to be involved in phy-
sician assisted death if there is no realistic alternative
to relieve patient suffering, during the time of the court
hearing I had come to be regarded as someone with
very conservative opinions.
My involvement in the public debate on euthanasia
followed my PhD study in 1981, in which I reported a
number of interviews with GPs about their attitudes
towards, and their experience with palliative care in
the terminal stage of life w2x. At that time euthanasia
was practised in secret. I divided the attitudes of GPs
towards palliative care into ‘paternalistic’, ‘mechanistic’
and ‘anticipatory’. The GPs who worked according to
the paternalistic model told me they had had no ex-
periences with euthanasia. Their patients had not
asked for it. However, if a patient was suffering badly
they increased the amounts of morphine even up to a
lethal dose without discussing this with the patients or
their families. The patients working according to the
mechanistic model stated that they had a good deal
of experience with euthanasia; more than ten cases
being no exception. The GPs reported that they had
acted in accordance with their patients’ express wish-
es and saw no reason to discuss the pros and cons
in depth. The most interesting group were the GPs
who practised in accordance with the anticipatory
model. They found it difficult to become involved in
euthanasia but said that they would not refuse eutha-
nasia if the patient requested it explicitly and they saw
no reasonable alternative. They also stated that they
would only practise euthanasia if they understood why
the patient asked for it and if they were in agreement
with the patient’s wish. GPs working within the antici-
patory model communicated much more frequently
with their patients than other GPs.
Almost all GPs who had had experience of euthanasia
stated that they never consulted colleagues or other
professionals. There existed a lack of knowledge
about the technical aspects of euthanasia but the GPs
in question did not dare to ask pharmacists, anaesthe-
tists or other GPs for advice, while textbooks and med-
ical journals offered no information of any kind. One
GP confessed to having suffocated a patient with a
pillow. Many doctors had emotional problems after
committing euthanasia, including mental stress and
sleeping disorders. All were without anybody in their
professional environment with whom they could share
their experiences and problems.
The shocking results of my study motivated me to join,
in 1984, a committee of the Board of the Royal Dutch
Medical Association (RMDA) for the formulation of
guidelines on euthanasia. The committee did not
defend the right of euthanasia but felt that the RMDA
could not deny the fact that many doctors were
involved in hidden euthanasia. It found that the RMDA
had the obligation to support those doctors and to
ensure that physicians should be able to decide and
act in professionally sound ways. Subsequently the
RMDA paid a great deal of attention to improving pal-
liative care as well as the communication, consultation
and assessment processes involved in physician-
assisted death. After 1984 the RDMA was given a
pivotal role in the debate about euthanasia in the Neth-
erlands. By skilful negotiation the RDMA succeeded in
introducing a notification procedure in 1991 by which
the quality of physician-assisted death could be made
subject to public and social control without the need
to prosecute any doctors involved in physician-assist-
ed death.
The key question in the euthanasia debate is what
type of argument or condition could justify physician-
assisted death. Some ethicists argue that the justifi-
cation for a physician’s acts should be assessed by
establishing a number of criteria, including whether the
physician respects the will of the patient (principle of
autonomy), his or her treatment harms the patient
(principle of no maltreatment) or benefits the patient
(principle of beneficence) and whether all patients are
treated equally (principle of justice). Nowadays most
defenders of euthanasia in the Netherlands mention
respect for the patient’s autonomy as the strongest
argument in favour of euthanasia and other life-termi-
nating acts. However, I fear that this might lead to sit-
uations in which it would be hard to resist patients’
wishes while reasonable alternatives were available,
or suffering could not be regarded as unbearable. The
presence of repeatedly iterated requests is insufficient,
and in cases of multiple defects in young children even
unnecessary. I regard physician-assisted death as an
evil, but an evil that can be justified if continued living
is an even greater evil. In other words, there are sit-
uations in which the evil of euthanasia may, relatively
speaking, be preferable to the evil of prolonged suf-
fering. Some say that it is the absolute duty of a doctor
to regard the preservation of human life as sacrosanct
and that the active termination of life is never com-
patible with this duty. I certainly respect this high moral
principle but I am also of the opinion that there are
certain duties which are determined by situations in
which there is an equally moral duty to apply the stan-
dards of euthanasia mentioned earlier.
Some suggest that the ‘double effect’ argument offers
a reasonable way out. This allows physicians to in-
crease the amount of morphine, even if they know that
the result is the patient’s premature death. The dis-
advantage of this type of practice is that the doctorsInternational Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 2, 1 March 2002 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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involved neither discuss their real motives nor the
expected results with either the patient or their fami-
lies; thus acting without consent of any kind. This type
of argument leaves room for morally ambivalent situ-
ations in which notification remains outside public
control.
Thomas McLean has formulated the duty of a doctor
as follows: ‘‘To assist us to come safely into the world
and comfortably out of it and during life to protect
the well and to care for the sick and disabled’’ w3x.I
emphasise that he restricts the domain of a doctor to
those who are sick and disabled. His way of looking
at the problem also stresses the fact that people who
have to face the end of their lives need palliative care.
I would wish to add to this that, in my experience, we
cannot avoid situations in which terminating life is the
only way that makes it possible for people to leave this
world comfortably, or in any case without unbearable
suffering. This implies that the justification for physi-
cian-assisted death lies in the principle of beneficence
rather than in the duty to respect patient autonomy.
I conclude with the observation that in some cases
physicians are confronted with situations in which the
arguments against assisted death weigh less than the
arguments for. If a patient requests euthanasia at an
early stage of illness, a doctor cannot but deny such
a request. In such a situation a patient will always
appreciate and respect a doctor’s promise never to
leave the patient alone w4x. I would also wish to make
a plea here for assisted death to be restricted to situ-
ations in which doctors are already involved in pallia-
tive care. Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
must be compatible with, and be part of appropriate
palliative care w5x.
In all this it is important to keep in mind that society
has a legitimate and genuine interest in the trans-
parency of doctors’ actions in death and dying. This
means that physicians must have the courage to
defend their actions in public debates and in the
courts.
As stated earlier, I agree with the judgement of the
higher court, while I see no merit in the argument that
a doctor should be qualified to give professional judge-
ments about situations in which patients suffer for rea-
sons external to the domain of medicine.
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